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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT




The Community Reinvestment Act of 19771 ("CRA") represents
an attempt to shape the economic and social condition of commu-
nities by altering the economic policies of depository institutions.
The CRA was passed to discourage disinvestment in urban, typi-
cally minority areas and to ensure that all communities, regardless
of their economic or demographic characteristics, have fair access
to credit. Its stated intent is vague, yet simple: to encourage each
bank2 "to meet the credit needs of its entire community, including
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with [the]
safe and sound operation of the bank."'3 The CRA has stimulated
debate across the ideological spectrum.4 The CRA's supporters
believe that it has provided increased access to credit in low- and
moderate-income ("LMI") neighborhoods, and that it could be
even more effective with greater enforcement.5 Critics of the
CRA, on the other hand, argue that the law saddles banks with
* Christopher A. Richardson, Ph.D., is an economist in the Housing & Civil
Enforcement section of the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division. He
was previously a financial economist at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent those of the Department of Justice or its staff.
1. The Community Reinvestment Act was passed as Title VIII of the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1998)).
2. In this Article, the term "bank" refers to any institution subject to CRA regu-
lations, including commercial banks and thrift institutions.
3. 12 C.F.R. § 25.7 (1995). Identical regulations have been disseminated by the
other regulatory agencies responsible for enforcing the CRA: the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. § 228.7 (1995), the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, 12 C.F.R. § 345.7 (1995), and the Office of Thrift Supervision, 12
C.F.R. § 563e.7 (1995).
4. For a discussion of liberal and conservative critiques of the CRA, see Anthony
D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Eco-
nomic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1465, 1490 (1994).
5. See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It
Works, But Strengthened Federal Enforcement Is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293,
283-86 (1993). See generally DIMITRI PAPADIMITRIOU, RONNIE J. PHILLIPS & L. RAN-
DALL WRAY, JEROME LEVY ECON. INST., WORKING PAPER No. 95, THE COMMUNITY
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substantial compliance costs and that unfettered credit markets can
properly allocate credit without ponderous government regula-
tion.6 Even with the dismantling of the walls of separation be-
tween banking, insurance, and securities underwriting achieved by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999,1
the CRA remains relevant. Its relevance emanates not only from
its economic impact on LMI neighborhoods and financial institu-
tions subject to CRA regulations, but also, as this Article discusses,
from its fusion of economic and social policy.
The CRA illustrates how regulatory policies can have both eco-
nomic consequences and social implications. The CRA's passage
in 1977 was based in part on the belief that it would benefit LMI
communities by providing access to more credit than would be
available otherwise.8 The Act's enforcement mechanism requires
that a bank comply with the CRA when it wishes to merge, acquire
REINVESTMENT ACT, LENDING DISCRIMINATION, AND THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY DE-
VELOPMENT BANKS (1993).
6. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination:
Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85
GEO. L.J. 237, 239 (1996) ("Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the
benefits of the CRA's regulatory framework are uncertain. The costs, on the other
hand, are clear. The CRA is, according to bankers, the most administratively burden-
some of all bank regulations."); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Com-
munity Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 294 (1993)
(arguing that the CRA, as it was implemented and enforced at the time they wrote
their article, "does more harm than good"); Lawrence J. White, The Community Rein-
vestment Act. Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 281, 305 (1993) (arguing that increased competition in financial services markets
undermines the CRA and that the CRA promotes unprofitable lending because prof-
itable lending in LMI areas would be made in its absence).
7. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(c)(3), (k)(1) (Supp. V 1999). Among other things, the Act removed many of
the restrictions governing the affiliation of banks, insurance companies, and invest-
ment banking firms imposed by the Glass Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994 & Supp.
II 1997); 12 U.S.C. §§ 78, 377 (1994), repealed by 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (Supp. V 1999); 12
U.S.C. § 378 (1994)). The bill was signed into law on November 12, 1999. Clinton
Signs Legislation Overhauling Banking Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1999, at B3.
8. Some have argued that access to credit will decrease under the CRA. Macey &
Miller, supra note 6, at 314, point out that
Because a bank's CRA rating is based on its lending practices in the area
contiguous to its offices, the CRA imposes greater costs on banks in poor
areas than those in wealthy areas to the extent that it causes banks to lend
funds locally. Banks located in wealthy areas can elect not to make loans in
poor areas without risking serious CRA challenge. Banks located in poor
areas, on the other hand, are effectively forced to devote a substantial pro-
portion of their loan portfolios to their local communities. Because of these
additional regulatory requirements and costs, banks seeking to expand will
be less likely to establish new branches or offices in poor areas than they
were prior to the promulgation of the CRA.
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existing branches, or open or close branches.9 Thus, the CRA has
direct economic effects on banks as well as on neighborhoods.
LMI areas, however, also may accrue social benefits from im-
proved access to credit. Greater credit access increases economic
prospects for residents and businesses in LMI areas. Improved ec-
onomic prospects can in turn improve the social condition of re-
sidents by decreasing crime, homelessness, inadequate heath care,
and neighborhood instability caused by low homeownership
rates.10 These external benefits-otherwise known as positive ex-
At the time the CRA was being debated, Robert Barnett, chairman of the FDIC,
wrote that
[T]he practical effect of the bill could be to discourage financial institutions
from making applications for offices in neighborhoods where funds are
badly needed because of the reexamination that this would entail with re-
spect to their lending policies in service areas where they already have of-
fices. Some institutions might even close down offices already established in
certain neighborhoods if they felt that they could be publicly criticized for
not meeting the credit needs of such neighborhoods when they apply for a
branch in another location. The result of this would be to increase the pre-
sent concentration of financial institution offices in more affluent
neighborhoods.
Id. (quoted from a letter from Robert Barnett, Chairman, FDIC, to Senator William
Proxmire (May 4, 1977), reprinted in Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S.406
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 133 (1977)). These economic arguments notwithstanding, it still remains the
case that the original intent of the CRA was to increase credit availability to LMI
neighborhoods.
9. See generally supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
10. For an analysis of the positive relation between poverty and crime, see H.
NACI MOCAN & DANIEL I. REES, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, WORKING
PAPER No. 7405, ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, DETERRENCE AND JUVENILE CRIME: Evi-
DENCE FROM MICRO DATA 17-18 (1999) (testing an economic model of juvenile crime
using micro-level data, the authors find that an increase in local unemployment and in
local poverty increases the propensity for juveniles to commit crimes and that family
poverty increases the probability of males committing robbery, burglary and theft,
and of females committing assault and burglary). The authors conclude that "Em-
ployment opportunities, increased family income and more strict deterrence are effec-
tive tools to reduce juvenile crime." Id.; see also EDWARD L. GLAESER & JOSEPH
GYOURKO, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER No. 8598, UR-
BAN DECLINE AND DURABLE HOUSING 5 (2001) (developing a model that explains
why declining cities disproportionately attract "low human capital" residents who face
higher levels of unemployment and poverty and earn lower wages, and suggesting that
the model "may help us understand the correlation between urban social problems
and declining urban population").
For evidence of the relation between income and health, see ANGUS DEATON &
DARREN Lubotsky, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8370, Mor-
tality, Inequality, and Race in America Cities and States 22-23 tbls. 1, 2 (2001) (show-
ing the negative relation between income and mortality for the fifty states, the District
of Columbia, and for 287 Metropolitan Statistical Areas). High crime rates are more
likely in large, urban areas. See Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban
Flight, and the Consequences for Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159 (1999) ("Violent
1609
1610 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
ternalities-are not limited to LMI areas themselves. High-income
suburban residents enjoy activities in central cities such as cultural
attractions and sporting events, and central cities continue to be
major hubs of economic activity in most large metropolitan areas.
A decrease in social problems in LMI communities is likely to con-
fer positive benefits to residents in other communities as well. Be-
cause these benefits do not accrue to banks lending in LMI
neighborhoods, however, banks do not take them into account
when making their lending and investment decisions. This leads to
a below-optimal level of lending and investment in LMI areas. By
requiring banks to meet the credit needs of LMI areas in their mar-
kets, CRA lending, investment, and service requirements11 can
lead to a higher level of social benefits than would be produced
absent credit market intervention.
The CRA stands out as a model for regulation based on eco-
nomic principles-the correction of redlining12 and inadequate
lending in LMI areas-and its attempt to encourage banks to oper-
ate in the best interest of consumers and society. Part I of this
Article examines the economic issues associated with providing ac-
cess to credit in LMI areas. Particular attention is paid to market
failure, information asymmetries, and social welfare maximization.
crime rates in U.S. cities with populations over 500,000 in 1993 were four times higher
than in cities with populations below 50,000, and seven times greater than in rural
areas.") (omitting citation). High crime rates also lead to neighborhood instability
and deterioration in housing values: "The results we obtain are consistent with a
strong relationship between changes in crime rates and urban flight.... Highly edu-
cated households [which earn higher incomes] and households with children are most
responsive to crime." Id. at 159-60.
11. CRA examinations conducted by the regulatory agencies currently consist of
three tests: the lending test, the investment test, and the service test. Banks are as-
signed ratings of "Outstanding," "Satisfactory," "Needs to Improve," or "Substantial
Noncompliance," based on the results of the three tests. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2)
(1994).
12. Redlining was defined by Senator William Proxmire, a sponsor of the CRA,
during the legislative debate for its creation. As he explained:
[Fior more than two years the Banking Committee has been studying the
problem of redlining and the disinvestment by banks and savings institutions
in older urban communities. By redlining let me make it clear what I am
talking about. I am talking about the fact that banks and savings and loans
will take their deposits from a community and instead of reinvesting them in
that community, they will ... actually or figuratively draw a red line on a
map around the areas of their city, . . .sometimes in the older neighbor-
hoods, sometimes ethnic and sometimes black, but often encompassing a
great area of their neighborhood.
123 CONG. REC. 17, 630 (1977). Areas contained within the literal or figurative "red
lines" denote areas where an institution will avoid, in whole or in part, reinvesting or
otherwise doing business.
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Market failure results, in part, from the positive externalities asso-
ciated with lending in LMI areas that are not internalized by lend-
ers. Even without these externalities, however, the amount of
lending to LMI areas suffers from the informational asymmetries
inherent in bank lending: Borrowers know more about their
probability of loan repayment and of the expected profitability of
their investment projects than do lenders. Such informational
asymmetries can cause lenders to ration the amount of credit they
provide to potentially high risk customers. 13 Informational asym-
metries are larger in LMI areas than in more affluent areas due to
the larger proportion of LMI borrowers who lack bank checking or
savings accounts-the so-called "unbanked.' 1 4 Such borrowers in-
crease the riskiness and lower the volume of LMI-area lending. In-
deed, the inherent risk involved in lending in LMI areas means that
absent regulation, lending volume and financial services will be
more volatile in LMI areas than elsewhere. Government regula-
tions such as the CRA can act as a buffer to the detrimental effects
of the withdrawal of credit.
To the extent that adequate flows of credit to LMI communities
provide external social benefits to society, the goal of improving
access to credit can be examined within the framework of the gov-
ernment's attempt to maximize social welfare. Within this para-
digm, government regulations (and their method of enforcement)
affect both efficiency (obtaining the highest possible aggregate so-
cial welfare, given resource constraints) and equity (distributing ag-
gregate social welfare in the most socially beneficial manner).15
13. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 394-95 (1981) (describing how information
asymmetries cause borrowers with lower average creditworthiness to be rationed out
of credit markets).
14. SHERRIE L. W. RHINE, MAUDE TOUSSAINT-COMEAU, JEANNE M. HOGARTH,
WILLIAM H. GREENE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE
FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS IN SERVING LMI NEIGHBORHOODS 63, 66 (Confer-
ence Proceedings of Changing Financial Markets and Community Development,
Working Paper, 2001) (Using survey data from the Metro Chicago Information
Center's 2000 survey of households in the Chicago metropolitan area, the authors
found that "The majority of unbanked households (70 percent) have incomes less
than $30,000 or live in LMI areas (74 percent) .... Studies have consistently shown
that unbanked consumers are more likely to have lower income and net worth, to
reside in an LMI neighborhood, to be less educated and unemployed, and to be more
heavily represented among Black, Hispanic, female, unmarried, and younger
consumers.
15. Although the maximization of social welfare does not involve equity concerns,
the particular constraints on economic behavior imposed by economic actors may
very well affect the distribution of income. Imagine a situation where the government
can choose between two different policies, both of which will result in the same aggre-
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The operative choices with regard to formulating governmental
policies and choosing the "best" policy from an array of alterna-
tives thus become the choice of incentives, created by the policies,
on which economic actors-consumers, firms, and the govern-
ment-will base their decisions. 16
Part II of this Article examines the interplay between incentives
and economic decision-making within the context of a conceptual
framework for investigating regulatory policy. The framework in-
volves separating the economic actions firms take in their normal
course of business-producing goods and services for profit-from
the regulatory actions the firm must undertake as required by the
relevant governing institution. Creating the dichotomy between
economic actions and regulatory actions allows a policymaker to
focus more sharply on two tasks fundamental to fostering the goal
of efficiency without undermining legitimate concerns of equity:
(1) deciding what goals are valued among economic actors and
consequently by society as a whole, and (2) implementing an incen-
tive structure that will support those societal goals in the most effi-
cient manner, while allowing actors to freely choose their actions.17
Ironically, a positive aspect of the CRA is its inherent ambiguity,
which stems from its vague wording18 and its reliance on bank reg-
ulators to craft regulations that delineate its enforcement proce-
dures. That ambiguity facilitates laying a foundation for a
regulatory structure that gives the CRA the flexibility it needs to
be a viable mechanism achieving efficiency and equity.
Despite the great potential of the CRA as a vehicle for progres-
sive economic and social policy, the current enforcement regime of
the CRA (initiated in 1995 as a revision of the pre-1995 "efforts-
based" regime) can still be improved upon. 19 Part III of this Arti-
cle offers a market-based enhancement to the CRA that can im-
gate amount of social welfare (for concreteness, define social welfare strictly in terms
of wealth). Suppose, however, that one policy distributes a higher proportion of
wealth to low-income individuals. Even though the maximization of "fairness" is not
a factor in the maximization of social welfare, certainly the choice of policies in this
case has equity ramifications.
16. For a discussion of the importance of incentives in the formation of public
policies, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 129-31 (1999).
17. The "freedom of economic choice" viewpoint espoused here is that of
Amartya Sen, see supra note 16, at 13-20, who has made the case in his writings that a
key measure of economic development and growth is the degree of freedom eco-
nomic actors have over their individual choices and prospects.
18. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 295 ("[The CRA's] requirements are vague
and self-contradictory, and its enforcement often appears arbitrary.").
19. For a discussion of differences between pre-1995 and post-1995 CRA regula-
tions, see DOUGLAS D. EVANOFF & LEWIS M. SEGAL, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI.,
1612
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prove its efficiency by creating property rights for a new financial
asset that gives banks more flexibility in meeting their CRA lend-
ing requirements. This increased flexibility will allow banks to
meet their CRA requirements at lower cost, while ensuring the
same amount of or more CRA lending in the aggregate. The mar-
ket-based enhancement that this Article proposes can be imple-
mented by a simple revision of the regulations2 ° without the need
for new legislation.
I. THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR THE CRA
To a large extent, the writing and passage of the CRA in 1977
was motivated by evidence of redlining and disinvestment of bank
deposits in LMI areas.21 Some scholars believe that an underlying
motivation for the CRA was not just to correct geographic credit
imbalances, but also to prevent racial discrimination in credit mar-
kets. 2 Although this may have been seen as a desirable byproduct
-of the CRA, race is not explicitly mentioned in the CRA statute.
To the extent that minorities are more likely to live in LMI neigh-
borhoods, ensuring fair access to credit for LMI neighborhoods im-
plies ensuring fair access to credit for minorities as well. Certainly,
by requiring banks to make credit available in areas where they
might not otherwise, the CRA can be expected to have indirect
positive effects on the incidence of discrimination in credit mar-
kets. A strict interpretation of the CRA's purpose, however, sug-
gests that it is an anti-redlining statute and not an anti-
discrimination statute.23
The CRA's goal of encouraging banks to meet the credit needs
of the communities where they accept deposits is more nebulous
than the intent of related anti-discrimination laws such as the
CRA AND FAIR LENDING REGULATIONS: RESULTING TRENDS IN MORTGAGE LEND-
ING 22-24 (1996).
20. The bank regulatory agencies are scheduled to revise the CRA regulations in
2002. In late 2001, the bank regulatory agencies circulated an advance notice of pro-
posed rulemaking for the 2002 revision of the CRA regulations. Joint Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 37602 (July 19, 2001).
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. Macey & Miller, supra note 6, at 298-99; see also Hylton & Rougeau, supra
note 6, at 246 ("In spite of its title and its general language about meeting the needs of
the community, it is well known that the CRA is aimed at eliminating a pattern that
seems to be racially discriminatory. The statute is framed in nonracial terms, but
interpretations by regulators and legislators consistently refer to minority groups.").
23. Discrimination in housing and other credit markets is expressly prohibited
under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2002)) and the Fair Hous-
ing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2002).
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Equal Credit Opportunity Act 4 and the Fair Housing Act. 25 It is
therefore particularly important that the CRA have a strong eco-
nomic basis. The CRA is justified on economic grounds by three
principles: (1) the presence of externalities in the market for mort-
gage and business loans in LMI areas that lead to the failure of
unregulated markets to produce adequate levels of credit to LMI
areas; (2) information asymmetries, whereby potential lenders in
LMI areas may find it too costly to obtain the requisite information
for determining profitability of prospective lending opportunities
and to properly assess credit risk in LMI areas; and (3) the govern-
ment's (implicit) desire to maximize some measure of social wel-
fare in the aggregate while increasing the social welfare of LMI
areas through the socially optimal allocation of credit.
A. Externalities and Market Failure
The economic underpinnings of the CRA are largely based on
the notion that low levels of lending in LMI areas result from the
inability of rational lending decisions made by profit-maximizing
lenders to achieve a socially optimal flow of credit to LMI areas.26
This market failure occurs because the marginal cost of a single
lender acquiring the information necessary to adequately assess
risk and identify profitable lending opportunities in LMI areas out-
weighs the potential marginal benefit the lender can expect to ac-
crue. In the extreme case, if no single lender is willing to incur the
necessary information cost, every lender will rationally decide not
to lend in the area, and no loans will be made.
One implication of this type of market failure is that lending in
LMI neighborhoods can create positive externalities that benefit
lenders-namely, information about property values and the ex-
pected profitability of business projects that all potential lenders in
an area can use but the cost of which is incurred only by the lender
making the loan.2 7 For example, mortgage-lending activity in a
neighborhood generates information about property appraisals.
These appraisals create a stock of information that can increase the
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2002).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2002).
26. Leonard Nakamura, Information Externalities: Why Lending May Sometimes
Need a Jump Start, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 3-14.
27. These positive "information externalities" are different from those mentioned
previously in this Article. Hereafter, the Article focuses on information externalities
because they more directly affect the parties creating the externalities in the first
place-the lenders. In doing so, the intent is not to minimize the importance of posi-
tive externalities resulting from the economic uplift of LMI neighborhoods.
1614
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accuracy of subsequent property value appraisals in the neighbor-
hood.28 The improved reliability of property appraisals brought
forth by the increased lending activity benefits all subsequent lend-
ers in the neighborhood and over time decreases information ac-
quisition costs. In this sense, the information created by sustained
lending in LMI areas is a "public good. '2 9 Because lower-income
neighborhoods typically have more uncertainty surrounding prop-
erty values than more affluent areas, information generation and
acquisition is critically important in LMI areas. Under the "infor-
mation as a public good" theory, the CRA's requirement that all
lenders in a community be active in lending, serving, and investing
in the community effectively increases the stock of information
about profitable lending opportunities and may lower loan denial
rates.3o
Notwithstanding the "public good" component of information
generated by bank lending, lending in LMI areas also requires the
investment of private bank resources. Information generated by
lending activity contains aspects of a private good. For example,
the experiences of a bank's loan officers when lending to a particu-
lar neighborhood are accessible only by the bank itself. The bank
directly benefits from incurring information costs to properly as-
sess credit risk. However, if a bank makes only a small number of
loans in an area, it may not be able to recoup its private investment
in information because the marginal return on the information in-
vestment may be less than the marginal cost of information acquisi-
tion. The bank may therefore be less willing (or unwilling) to make
the private investment necessary for profitable lending, which de-
creases lending activity.
Assessing the relative importance of the public good versus the
private good aspects of lending is ultimately an empirical question.
Robert Avery, Patricia Beeson, and Mark Sniderman 31 examined
the public good and private good aspects of lending using data
made available pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
28. Nakamura, supra note 26, at 4, 5.
29. See William W. Lang & Leonard I. Nakamura, A Model of Redlining, 33 J.
URB. ECON. 223-34 (1993); Robert B. Avery, Patricia E. Beeson & Mark S. Snider-
man, Information Dynamics and CRA Strategy, FED. RES. BANK OF CLEVELAND
ECON. COMMENT., Feb. 1, 1997, at 2; Nakamura, supra note 26, at 5.
30. Avery et al., supra note 29, at 2.
31. Id.
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("HMDA").32 They did not find evidence supporting the public
good information effect. However, they did find support for the
"private good" information effect: mortgage denial rates for a
lender decrease as the number of loans the lender processes in a
neighborhood increases.33 These findings have an important impli-
cation for CRA enforcement: the strict view regulatory agencies
took before the CRA was revised in 1995 regarding each lender's
obligation to be directly active in all portions of its assessment
area 34 "may not be in the best interest of the most underserved
communities, where there are relatively few transactions. 35
The authors' conclusion implies that lenders that service LMI ar-
eas need a critical mass of business volume to enjoy economies of
scale and to make lending in those areas cost-effective.36 It also
suggests that efforts by regulatory agencies to encourage banks to
generate loans in LMI areas on a larger scale may yield Pareto-
improving allocations of loans in those areas. Pareto efficiency is
defined as a situation when no one can be made better off without
making someone else worse off.37 The authors point out that their
results support the idea that banks would be well served to take
advantage of the increased flexibility of the 1995 revision of the
CRA by taking advantage of "resource-pooling arrangements" in
their CRA compliance strategies.38
B. Information Asymmetries
A fundamental issue affecting credit allocation in LMI areas is
information asymmetry. Information asymmetries occur in the
lending process because borrowers typically have a greater quan-
tity and quality of information about their creditworthiness and the
expected profitability of their projects than lenders do. Because
the information lenders possess is incomplete, lenders must infer
the creditworthiness of loan applicants and the expected profitabil-
ity of potential loan opportunities by referring to signals provided
32. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1999). The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was origi-
nally enacted as The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 301-310, 89
Stat. 1125-1128 (1975).
33. The public good and private good hypotheses tested in Avery et al., supra note
29, are not inopposite; accepting one does not necessarily imply rejecting the other.
Each must be tested separately.
34. See EVANOFF & SEGAL, supra note 19, at 23 (noting that "regulators have
been more strict in assigning CRA ratings").
35. Avery et al., supra note 29, at 4.
36. Id. at 28.
37. HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIc ANALYSIS 225 (1992).
38. See Avery et al., supra note 29, at 4.
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by the applicant, such as credit scores, income, past financial rela-
tionships with the applicant, collateral, the amount of money the
applicant is willing and able to put up in the transaction (e.g., down
payments for mortgage loans), and possibly, although it is illegal to
do so, race, gender, or other characteristics prohibited by the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA").39 Even under the best circum-
stances, however, it is unlikely that these signals of applicant
creditworthiness will precisely predict the likelihood of borrower
repayment or project success. In the economic literature, many re-
searchers have shown that these types of information asymmetries
can lead to the rationing of credit."n
Information asymmetries are a critical source of sub-optimal
levels of credit in LMI communities because potential borrowers
are typically at a disadvantage in signaling their creditworthiness
using the aforementioned methods. By definition, LMI areas have
less income than other areas. Moreover, the LMI/non-LMI area
disparity in wealth (wealth can be used as collateral or as a down
payment) is even greater than the disparity in income.41 Residents
of LMI areas are less likely than residents in wealthier neighbor-
hoods to use traditional financial service institutions like banks and
credit unions.4" They are also less likely to have a past relationship
39. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1988 & Supp. IV
1992); see also 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1993) (promulgating Regulation B, issued pursuant to
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
40. See Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Reinvestment: A Mar-
ket-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561,
1566-68 (1995) (discussing asymmetric information and credit rationing); Stephen D.
Williamson, Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Ra-
tioning, 18 J. MONETARY ECON. 159 (1986) (discussing the link between equilibrium
credit rationing and financial intermediation). See generally Dwight Jaffee & Joseph
Stiglitz, Credit Rationing, in HANDBOOK OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 2, at 839 (Benja-
min M. Friedman & Frank H. Hahn eds., 1990); Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note 13
(describing adverse selection in bank lending).
41. Using data from the 1988 Survey of Income and Program Participation
("SIPP"), Oliver and Shapiro find that "Whites possess nearly twelve times as much
median net worth as blacks, or $43,800 versus $3,700." MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS
M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
EQUALITY 86 (1995). This large racial disparity, coupled with the fact that African-
Americans i) are disproportionately represented in LMI areas, ii) experience lower
rates of homeownership than whites at all levels of income, iii) own less valuable
homes than whites when they do own homes ($45,000 median home value for whites
versus $31,000 for blacks in 1987 SIPP database), and iv) receive a greater proportion
of their accumulated wealth from home equity ("63 percent of all black wealth and 43
percent of all white wealth" as calculated Trom the 1987 SIPP database), implies that
the disparity in wealth between LMI and non-LMI neighborhoods is larger than the
disparity in income. Id. at 108, 109 tbl. 5.4.
42. See RHINE ET AL., supra note 14, at 63.
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with a depository institution. The large proportion of unbanked
residents can leave an LMI community particularly vulnerable in
the event of bank disinvestment, for if local deposits leave these
areas to be invested in more affluent ones, the barriers to lending
erected by information asymmetries may be so high that out-of-
market lenders will not be willing or able to incur the costs and
risks of lending there. The end result of disinvestment is often that
borrowers in LMI areas lose their most promising sources of capi-
tal. Even though LMI areas do not always have significantly lower
credit scores than more affluent areas,43 the more limited use of
traditional banking services by LMI residents makes it more diffi-
cult for those residents to establish credit histories that will lead to
high credit scores." Finally, given the fact that LMI areas are typi-
cally disproportionately populated by African Americans and His-
panics,45 the potential for illegal discrimination is greater than in
more affluent areas.46
There are, however, ways to alleviate information asymmetries.
One means is engaging in "relationship lending," whereby bank
customers make repeated transactions with a particular lender.47
A bank that does business with a customer repeatedly gains more
information about that customer's repayment patterns, risk of de-
fault, sensitivity to adverse economic shocks, and financial capacity
than if the customer was only making one transaction with the
bank. Moreover, if the customer lives in the general vicinity of the
bank branch, the bank is also able to make more accurate assess-
ments of the overall economic conditions facing the customer. This
43. "People in low-income neighborhoods are almost as likely to have strong
credit scores as those in high-income neighborhoods." Edward Kulkosky, Pipeline
Fed. Low-Income Areas Get Good Credit Scores Series. 6, AM. BANKER, Aug. 28,
1996, at 6. In quoting a Federal Reserve Board study on the power of credit scores in
predicting loan performance, the article made the point that "'Most households have
relatively high scores, regardless of the income or home-value characteristics of the
area in which they reside.' Households in neighborhoods with low incomes or low
home values do tend to have lower credit scores, but one researcher said the impact
was minor."Id.
44. See RHINE ET AL., supra note 14, at 63, 69.
45. See id. at 59, 74.
46. This is not to imply that discrimination is rampant in LMI areas or that lenders
necessarily have a greater propensity to discriminate in LMI areas. My point is simply
that there is a greater opportunity for illegal discrimination based on a protected class
in areas where greater numbers of that protected class are present.
47. See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of
Credit in Small Firm Finance, 68 J. Bus. 351, 351-81 (1995); Mitchell Berlin & Loretta
J. Mester, Deposits and Relationship Lending, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 579, 579-607 (1999);
M.A. Petersen & R.G. Rajan, The Benefits of Firm-Creditor Relationships: Evidence
from Small Business Data, 49 J. oF FIN. 3, 3-37 (1994).
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additional information can allow the bank to make more precise
evaluations of the expected return on a potential loan with the bor-
rower than would otherwise be possible, without incurring addi-
tional monitoring or risk assessment costs.
C. Social Welfare Maximization
The problem with the externalities and informational asymme-
tries present in credit markets is that they do not allow banks to
allocate credit in ways that maximize not only their private bene-
fits, but also the social benefits of all parties either directly or indi-
rectly affected by banks' activities. Maximization of these benefits
requires the allocation of credit across communities to be Pareto
efficient.48 The maximization of social welfare-an aggregation of
the social benefits enjoyed by all economic actors-while not an
explicit goal of the CRA, is certainly in agreement with the stated
goals of the CRA.
Economic theory melds considerations of Pareto efficiency and
of equity through the construct of a social welfare function which
aggregates the utility functions of all economic entities (firms and
consumers).4 9 The function includes weights that indicate the rela-
tive importance of one person's or firm's utility in relation to other
persons or firms. The social welfare function is a useful concept
because it allows one to consider simultaneously all parties that
may be affected by an economic policy or action, instead of consid-
ering each group of affected parties separately. When the well-be-
ing of individuals is considered in isolation, it becomes easy to
shortchange one individual at the expense of another by ignoring
the possible effect of one individual's actions on another's well-
being.
The maximization of a social welfare function implies Pareto ef-
ficiency.5 ° More importantly, under certain technical assumptions,
the converse is true: every Pareto efficient allocation of goods max-
48. See VARIAN, supra note 37 and accompanying text for a definition of Pareto
efficiency.
49. Mathematically, the problem of maximizing social welfare can be expressed as
a function
n
max W(U1(x1),....U,,(x,)) s.t. I xi < w9, g = 1.k
u=l
where W is the social welfare function, Ui is the utility of the i" consumer, x is the ith
consumer's consumption of the k different goods and services in the economy, and W9
is the total amount (initial endowment) of the gth good or service in the economy.
VARIAN, supra note 37, at 333.
50. Id. at 334.
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imizes social welfare for some social welfare function."1 So, in
terms of government policy, it might appear that all that really
needs to be done is to make sure that social welfare is maximized,
which implies that the allocation of resources and loans and profits
in the economy are Pareto efficient-a task that in some cases
might indicate that the best governmental policy is no policy (or at
least a policy to refrain from interfering with the free market).
However, the challenge facing society lies not only in maximiz-
ing social welfare, but also in choosing the "proper" (i.e., most eq-
uitable) social welfare function.52 This is why the CRA's ability to
increase the relative weight of LMI neighborhoods in the social
welfare function is so important. This re-weighting is crucial be-
cause the weights are directly related to an agent's income-agents
with larger income have larger weights in the implicit social welfare
function. 3 The CRA, however, raises the relative weights of LMI
neighborhoods and lowers the weights of more affluent neighbor-
hoods. In so doing, the CRA attempts to redistribute wealth from
non-LMI areas to LMI areas.5 4
A careful consideration of the social welfare aspects of govern-
ment regulation can assist the development of a conceptual frame-
work for evaluating and formulating socially optimal regulatory
policy. The next Part of this Article takes a step in that direction.
II. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATORY POLICY
This Part uses the economic principles discussed in the previous
Part to develop a general theoretical framework for regulatory
compliance mechanisms. The framework is based on recognizing
the economic incentives available to firms as they pursue the dual
tasks of maximizing profits while complying with government regu-
lations. This Part discusses how firms' compliance with govern-
ment regulations can be made more efficient through market
creation and property rights. The key lies in recognizing the inher-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 335.
53. Id.
54. The operative word here is attempt; the redistribution does not occur automat-
ically. The allocation of capital and wealth in the CRA's absence may in theory maxi-
mize some social welfare function, but such allocation generally will not maximize
social welfare once the CRA affects the reweighting of individual utilities. Redistri-
bution must take place in order for social welfare to once again be maximized under
the new, reweighted social welfare function. For additional theoretical background in
social choice theory, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY
149-84 (1990).
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ent value (or cost) of a firm engaging in actions solely to satisfy a
government regulation.
A firm, during the course of conducting its business, will often
either: (1) perform ancillary actions or create derivative products-
byproducts of the firm's main business activities (i.e., pollution cre-
ated by a chemical processing plant)-that create externalities; or
(2) perform actions or create products subject to restrictions im-
posed by a governmental entity (i.e., making "CRA loans") that
also may create externalities. In the first case, the byproduct is
produced as an unavoidable consequence of the firm creating its
primary product; in the second case, the byproduct is produced in-
tentionally in an attempt to comply with the law. The byproduct in
both scenarios distorts to some extent the firm's profit-maximizing
decisions. In other words, in the absence of the externality or regu-
lation, the firm would face a different optimization problem and
would probably make different production decisions.
Let us assume that in the first case above the firm produces a
"bad good"-pollution, and that in the second case the firm is re-
quired by law to create a "good good"-CRA loans. Consider for
the moment the case where these derivative products are ignored.
What happens? The first case demonstrates the theory of external-
ities: the firm will not internalize the negative effect of the pollu-
tion it produces, which will lead to it to produce an amount of
pollution that is more than socially optimal. 6 In the second case,
the firm will maximize its profits 7 in such a way that the CRA
regulatory requirement is met. If one assumes that CRA loans are
less profitable (on average and at the margin) than conventional
loans,58 the firm will make the bare minimum of CRA loans neces-
sary for compliance. However, because the marginal expected re-
55. In economic parlance, the firm would be optimizing a different objective func-
tion, subject to different constraints.
56. This Article is implicitly making the assumption that any positive amount of
pollution emitted by the firm is bad and thus lowers social welfare (i.e., the marginal
social damage caused by the firm's pollution is positive), which rules out any "thresh-
old effects" of pollution whereby a firm may not produce enough pollution to move
the aggregate level of pollution above the threshold level. In such a situation, the firm
would not be said to be producing more than the socially optimal amount of pollution,
because the marginal social damage caused by its pollution would be zero.
57. More generally, the firm will maximize some objective function, which may
include factors other than profits.
58. This is a reasonable assumption in many, but not all, cases. A study of the
largest financial institutions subject to CRA regulations by the Federal Reserve Board
indicated that the majority of lenders surveyed found CRA-related lending to be as
profitable as conventional lending, with a small percentage of institutions claiming
that its CRA lending was more profitable than conventional lending. See generally
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turn for CRA loans is lower at the minimum level of CRA lending
than for conventional loans, the firm will be forced to forego the
additional profits it would have earned if it had been allowed to
allocate its loanable funds between conventional and CRA loans so
that the marginal expected returns for both loan types were equal.
In the real world of many heterogeneous firms, both results fail
to satisfy the Pareto criterion for efficiency. Consider the pollution
example first. If firms are heterogeneous in their effectiveness of
pollution abatement (perhaps because some firms are able to
achieve a certain level of production while emitting less pollution
than other firms), then the production of a given aggregate amount
of pollution can be re-allocated through the creation of property
rights for pollution. This can be achieved in the form of pollution
"credits," whereby firms with better pollution abatement technol-
ogy can sell pollution credits to firms with less effective abatement
technology. Thus, the high-polluting firms can avoid restricting
production or buying expensive pollution abatement equipment,
both of which lower profits. Instead, these firms can purchase ad-
ditional pollution credits to cover the extra pollution they produce.
Because the high-polluting firms can always revert to the status
quo of imposing production restrictions or purchasing pollution
abatement technology, they will be no worse off than before, and
some will be made strictly better off. The low-polluting firms can
receive additional revenue from selling their unused allotment of
pollution credits without changing their production; thus, they are
no worse off than before, and some will be strictly better off.
Conceptually, the creation of pollution property rights can be
thought of as a separation of the normal actions the firm performs
in its line of business to earn profits (what I call "economic ac-
tions") from the actions it is required to perform to comply with
the government regulation of pollution (what I call "regulatory ac-
tions"). If the intent of the regulation of pollution is to achieve
some sort of aggregate (i.e., regional or national) pollution abate-
ment goal rather than a firm-level goal, a market for the regulatory
good of pollution can be created, property rights can be estab-
lished, and firms can use the price mechanism to re-allocate the
production of pollution at minimum (i.e., productively efficient)
cost. In this way, the price mechanism can facilitate cooperative
behavior between firms in the aggregate production of the regula-
tory good.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE PERFORMANCE AND PROFIT-
ABILITY OF CRA-RELATED LENDING (2000).
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A relevant real-world example of this principle is the collection
of emissions-trading permit systems designed by the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency ("EPA") under Title IV of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990.59 This trading system, and others like it,
create de facto property rights for emissions. These property
rights, called allowances, consist of a system whereby one allow-
ance is defined as the right to emit one ton of pollutant into the
atmosphere.60 Such systems have replaced the traditional "com-
mand and control" regime of air pollutant regulation whereby reg-
ulators required all production plants, regardless of size or
production mix, to install expensive equipment designed to de-
crease emissions.
The Title IV program, which regulates sulfur dioxide (S02) emis-
sions from electric utilities, created a national market for SO 2 per-
mits. 61 The trading program was designed specifically to reduce
62 Athe level of SO 2 emissions. The Act created de facto property
rights for emissions called allowances, with one allowance defined
as the right to emit one ton of SO 2 into the atmosphere. The al-
lowances, or permits, which are freely tradable, give utility compa-
nies complete flexibility in determining how they will comply with
their obligations under the law.63
The Title IV trading program has resulted in large reductions in
health-care costs and in regulatory compliance costs. Researchers
have estimated that in 1995 the cost savings from permit trading
totaled approximately $97 million or thirteen percent of estimated
compliance costs in the absence of the trading program. In 2005
the cost savings are expected to total $531 million or approximately
thirty-seven percent of compliance costs in the absence of the trad-
ing program.64 In addition, the trading program resulted in aggre-
gate estimated health-related benefits nationally of almost $570
million in 1995 and is expected to result in approximately $125 mil-
lion of such benefits in 2005.65




62. DALLAS BURTRAW & ERIN MANSUR, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, Discus-
SION PAPER No. 99-25, THE EFFECTS OF TRADING AND BANKING IN THE SO 2 ALLOW-
ANCE MARKET 1 (1999).
63. Paul L. Joskow, Richard Schmalensee & Elizabeth M. Bailey, The Market for
Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 669, 669-85 (1998).
64. BURTRAW & MANSUR, supra note 62, at 19.
65. Id. at 2.
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The conceptual regulatory framework discussed above has an
important implication for the structure of laws and government
regulations: laws should be written flexibly enough for the pricing
mechanisms to be implemented in situations where they can be ef-
ficiency-enhancing, yet specific enough about goals to adequately
support the social and equity goals underlying the intent of the law.
As the next Part illustrates, the concept of separation of economic
and regulatory actions is particularly applicable to the CRA.
III. APPLICATION: A MARKET-BASED ENHANCEMENT
TO THE CRA
The regulatory framework outlined in Part II can be applied to
develop a system to make the CRA more efficient. As justifiable
as the CRA may be on economic and equity grounds, the imple-
mentation of the current CRA6 6 contains some inefficiencies. The
requirement that every institution be directly involved in lending to
all parts of its market area (including LMI areas)67 can impose sub-
stantial costs on banks, and more importantly, may result in the
inefficient use of resources by banks that do not possess the "com-
munity capital" necessary to identify profitable lending opportuni-
ties and properly assess risk in LMI areas. Moreover, there may
not be enough profitable lending opportunities available to make
lending in LMI areas profitable for every bank operating in an
area-there may be too many banks chasing after too few loans.68
For these reasons, it is possible that the creation of a new market
for CRA regulatory compliance credits-which I call "CRA vouch-
ers"-may result in a Pareto-improving allocation of CRA loans
among banks in LMI areas. Under certain conditions this may lead
to a higher aggregate volume of CRA loans in LMI areas as well.
66. By "the current CRA," I am referring to the reform of the CRA regulations
that occurred in 1995 and went into effect in 1997, but not the changes stipulated by
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, as they have not fully taken effect.
67. See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 29, at 1 ("Under the CRA's provisions, bank
regulators are required to use their supervisory authority to encourage each deposi-
tory institution-including those in low- and moderate-income communities-to help
meet its community's credit needs consistent with safe and sound lending practices.").
68. In contrast, one can view predatory lenders as lenders who make loans profita-
ble that would be unprofitable for most legitimate, nondiscriminatory, regulated
banks. However, the means by which they make such loans profitable-exorbitant
interest rates, excessive mortgage points and fees, equity-stripping loan terms, and
opportunistic "loan flipping" practices-are not viable or desirable options for mak-
ing profitable loans in LMI areas for government-regulated financial institutions. For
a comprehensive discussion of the characteristics of predatory lending, see KATHLEEN
C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoy, A TALE OF THREE MARKETS: THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF PREDATORY LENDING (Working Paper, Sept. 1, 2001).
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CRA vouchers represent a new financial asset, with property rights
created by the regulator, and are designed to give banks added
flexibility in establishing their CRA compliance. Michael Klausner
advanced a similar idea with the same underlying principle.69 This
Part applies the conceptual framework of separating regulatory ac-
tions from economic actions to expand on Klausner's concept of
"tradable obligations"70 and propose a basic structure for a CRA
voucher compliance system.
A. Characteristics of a Market-Based CRA Compliance System
The basic structure of a CRA voucher system is as follows. As-
sume there are two banks, A and B, operating in a geographic mar-
ket. For the purposes of this Article, a CRA voucher is defined as
an agreement that bank B (A) will count a specified dollar amount
of bank A's (B's) CRA-qualifying loans towards its own CRA
compliance. So, for example, one CRA voucher for bank B might
equal CRA credit for $1 million of bank A's CRA loans. 1 The
CRA voucher would specify the loan(s) in the voucher-issuing
bank's portfolio for which CRA credit will be granted, as well as
each loan's essential identifying characteristics, such as the origina-
tion date, loan type (single-family mortgage, business, consumer,
etc.), loan term, and geographic location. These details are neces-
69. Klausner, supra note 40, at 1580 (discussing the concept of "tradable obliga-
tions"). Klausner argued that although the CRA was intended to correct a market
failure (banks' sub-optimal allocation of credit to LMI neighborhoods), the CRA's
requirement that every bank make substantial efforts to lend in LMI areas prevents
banks from economizing on information costs and internalizing information about
LMI neighborhoods-information that is often costly to obtain-and could lead to
inefficiency in originating CRA loans.
70. Klausner's "tradable obligations" proposal, Klausner, supra note 69, at 1580,
differs in some respects from the "CRA voucher" system discussed in this Article, as
will be discussed.
71. My definition of a "CRA loan" would coincide with the definition used by the
Federal Reserve, EVANOFF & SEGAL, supra note 19, at 24: "For one- to four-family
residential mortgage lending, a CRA-related loan was defined to mean any loan made
within the banking institution's CRA assessment area to a low- or moderate-income
borrower (regardless of neighborhood income) or in a low- or moderate-income
neighborhood (regardless of borrower income). For small business lending, a CRA-
related loan was defined as any small business loan (as defined in the CRA regula-
tions) made within the banking institution's CRA assessment area to a firm with an-
nual revenues of $1 million or less (regardless of neighborhood income) or in a low-
and moderate-income neighborhood (regardless of firm size)."
Alternatively, CRA vouchers could be defined in terms of the number of loans (for
example, one CRA voucher equals credit for one CRA loan). This type of definition
might be preferable in some cases because in some CRA examinations regulators
focus more closely on the number of CRA loans than on the dollar amount.
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sary to verify during bank B's (A's) CRA examination that the
loans comprising the voucher are in its self-defined market area
designated for CRA assessment (its "assessment area"); to assign
CRA credit to the proper loan category; and to prevent the
voucher-issuing bank from double-counting CRA loans for which
it has sold compliance credit. A bank would be allowed to sell
CRA vouchers for any of its originations that qualify for CRA con-
sideration, typically any loans made in LMI areas in the voucher-
purchasing bank's assessment area.
Under the most conservative implementation of the voucher
proposal, CRA examinations would remain fundamentally un-
changed. In the course of a CRA examination, the regulator would
add the loan amounts for the purchased CRA vouchers to the
bank's originations (excluding any loans included in any CRA
vouchers that the bank may have sold) and purchased loans. A
bank's rating on the lending test portion of the CRA examination
would depend on the bank's quantity and distribution of loan origi-
nations, purchased loans, and CRA vouchers; the investment and
service tests would be unaffected. From an operational standpoint,
the counting of CRA vouchers would resemble that of purchased
loans.v2 The origination and servicing responsibilities for CRA-
voucher loans would remain with the voucher-issuing bank. As is
the case with purchased loans, if the originating bank subsequently
decides to sell the voucher loans outright or sell only the servicing
rights, the purchaser cannot receive CRA credit for those loans or
servicing rights (as this would be double-counting). Since in princi-
ple the efficiency of compliance is not affected by how the regula-
tory value of a loan is divided among its origination and servicing
components, it would make sense from an administrative stand-
point to count CRA vouchers as equivalent to originations. At any
rate, because banks would be trading CRA vouchers solely for
their CRA compliance value, it would be imperative for ensuring
the integrity of the pricing mechanism that the weighting of each
CRA voucher be consistent.
A more radical implementation approach more along the lines of
Klausner's proposal would involve the establishment of explicit
72. This aspect of CRA vouchers differs from Klausner's tradable obligations.
Klausner, supra note 69, at 1581, proposes a "quota" be assigned to each bank, which
can be met by either originating loans or purchasing them. However, the bank can
"sell" part of or its entire obligation under the quota (hence the term "tradable obli-
gations"). My proposal, in contrast, does not require the assignment of quotas (al-
though they could be imposed as an option).
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lending requirements for banks. Explicit CRA lending targets
would remove much of the ambiguity surrounding the CRA exami-
nation process. However, given the widespread acceptance of the
regime of "soft" CRA lending requirements currently in place for
banks, explicit mandatory CRA lending requirements do not ap-
pear to be a viable option.
Fortunately, the recent success and growth of loan securitization
as a tool for banks to meet CRA lending requirements su ggests
that explicit mandatory lending targets are likely to be unneces-
sary. A realistic alternative to explicit lending targets is to allow
banks to use CRA vouchers as an additional CRA compliance tool
along with loan securitization. Within the current CRA compli-
ance framework, regulators could give CRA credit to vouchers in a
manner similar to loan securitization. In this way, CRA vouchers
would add flexibility to the current regulatory compliance process
that can be used to realize gains from trade and foster "coopera-
tive" agreements within the conventional banking system.
CRA-voucher buying and selling would only be permitted by in-
stitutions subject to CRA regulations. This restriction is necessary
because the administrative task of verifying the CRA-applicability
of the underlying loans realistically could only be accomplished if
both parties are subject to regulatory review. Moreover, because
the voucher system is intended to increase efficiency in the produc-
tion of CRA loans by institutions subject to the CRA, institutions
outside the reach of the CRA that provide credit to LMI communi-
ties (finance companies and non-depository subprime lenders, for
example) should not be involved in voucher buying or selling.
Without such restrictions, non-CRA regulated institutions could
engage in voucher buying for the express purpose of forcing non-
compliance by CRA-governed banks, or, if they were allowed to
sell CRA vouchers, the voucher system would have the perverse
effect of allowing a greater proportion of CRA-qualifying loans to
be originated outside the CRA-regulated banking system, a partic-
ularly undesirable result considering that the majority of predatory
lenders currently are not subject to CRA regulations.73
B.1. Efficiency and Pricing
For the CRA voucher system to be an unambiguous improve-
ment to the current CRA compliance system in terms of efficiency,
the system must not violate the Pareto principle. For Pareto effi-
73. ENGEL & McCoy, supra note 68, at 27-29.
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ciency considerations, it seems reasonable to focus on the parties
that would be directly affected by a voucher system: consumers (in
both LMI and non-LMI areas), banks subject to the CRA, and the
regulators. Consumers would be better off if a voucher system re-
sulted in more CRA lending without decreasing non-CRA lending,
or in lower prices without decreasing the amount of CRA and non-
CRA lending. Banks subject to CRA regulations would benefit
from a voucher system if profits were to increase. Profits would
increase if average CRA loan costs declined without increasing for
non-CRA loans, if the average profitability of CRA lending in-
creased, or if a bank was able to make more non-CRA loans and
fewer CRA loans (assuming the marginal profitability of non-CRA
loans for the bank is higher than that of CRA loans) while still
remaining in compliance. The regulators would benefit if CRA ex-
aminations could be completed in less time, if the voucher system
fostered more amicable relations with banks, or if the positive re-
ception of a voucher system created some political capital the regu-
lators could use to push other regulatory items on their agenda.
The CRA voucher system should not be expected to violate the
Pareto principle if the agents in the government's social welfare
function are limited to consumers, banks subject to the CRA, and
the regulators.74 Under the worst case scenario (excluding the case
where no one trades CRA vouchers even though they are availa-
ble), the total number of CRA loans made remains constant, but
the distribution of CRA loans among lenders shifts. The shift in
distribution will satisfy the Pareto principle if (1) every customer
who would receive a loan in the absence of CRA vouchers receives
one under the voucher system, (2) no customer pays a higher rate
than she would in the absence of CRA vouchers, and (3) no bank
earns lower profit than it would in the absence of CRA vouchers.
74. Certainly, there are other parties that are affected by CRA enforcement, such
as lenders not subject to the CRA, and community groups. This Article argues that
these groups are not relevant for the purpose of assessing the efficiency impact of
CRA vouchers if one takes the viewpoint that, all else being equal, more loans being
made by CRA-regulated lenders and less made by non-CRA-regulated lenders will
result in a net positive social benefit. Also, if there are more efficient and less costly
ways of providing credit to LMI areas other than non CRA-regulated lenders, and
non-CRA-regulated lenders are free to enter the CRA-regulated market; resources
will be shifted from non-CRA-regulated lenders to CRA-regulated lenders so that the
overall efficiency of LMI-area lending will increase. To the extent that non-CRA-
regulated lenders include predatory lenders who make non-economic profits (profits
that exceed those that would be attained under proper risk-adjusted pricing and com-
petitive mechanisms), from a normative standpoint it does not seem appropriate to
consider their welfare in efficiency calculations.
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Let us now consider the conditions. Because the CRA voucher
system shifts the production of CRA loans from higher-cost pro-
ducers to lower-cost producers, any loan that was profitable to
make without CRA vouchers will remain so under CRA vouchers.
If a particular CRA loan was made by a low-cost producer before
the CRA voucher system, it will continue to be produced by that
producer under the voucher system. If a loan was made by a high-
cost producer, either the high-cost producer will buy vouchers from
the low-cost producer and the low-cost producer will expand pro-
duction to make the loan the high-cost producer no longer makes,
or some other producer with lower marginal CRA loan costs than
the high-cost producer will expand production. To the extent there
exist unrealized economies of scale in CRA loan production, the
expansion of CRA lending by low-cost CRA lenders may further
drive down costs. This would achieve conditions (1) and (3) above.
Condition (2), ensuring that no customer pays more for credit
under a voucher system, is more problematic. The change in credit
prices under a voucher system is ambiguous due to two opposing
forces. This shift in CRA loan production to lower-cost producers
and the attainment of any economies of scale by lower-cost pro-
ducers will tend to decrease CRA lending costs and consequently
decrease CRA loan prices. On the other hand, the reduction of
competition in the CRA loan market will tend to encourage non-
competitive CRA loan pricing and result in an increase in CRA
loan rates. The net result will depend on the magnitude of the ef-
fect of a voucher system on the concentration of CRA lending in
local lending markets, as well as the sensitivity of low-cost pro-
ducer credit prices to changes in marginal cost.
It is impossible to make conclusive statements about CRA loan
prices under a voucher system without a formal mathematical
model, although one would suspect the reputational effects of be-
ing one of a few CRA-loan originators in a market would deter
profiteering by low-cost CRA lenders.75 Regulators as well as
community groups would need to be involved in making sure some
of the efficiency gains generated by a voucher system are passed on
to borrowers in LMI areas.
B.2. Loan Securitization
It is reasonable to ask the question of whether existing financial
instruments, particularly loan securitizations, would have the same
75. ENGEL & McCoy, supra note 68, at 45-47.
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characteristics and advantages of the CRA voucher system out-
lined above. Loan securitization is a major facet of bank asset
management, and current CRA guidelines allow securitized loan
purchases to count toward CRA compliance.76
A CRA voucher system would differ from the current secondary
market for loans in many respects. The vast majority of loan
securitizations involve mortgages; small business loans and other
loans that receive CRA credit represent a small fraction of total
loan securitizations.77 To date, most of the small business loans
that have been securitized are either real estate loans or small busi-
ness loans originated under lending programs operated by the U.S.
Small Business Administration ("SBA"). Several factors compli-
cate commercial loan securitization: the lack of product standardi-
zation (compared with standard thirty-year and fifteen-year
mortgage products), difficulties in risk assessment, and high trans-
action costs (a direct consequence of a lack of product standardiza-
tion and difficulties in risk assessment). Indeed, the minimum
transaction cost of securitizing a commercial loan pool can run
from about $500,000 to $1 million, and approximately $50-$100
million in loans is the minimum pool size that must be reached
before securitization becomes cost effective.78 As the majority of
commercial banks have fewer than $5 billion in assets 79 and loan
portfolios that are diversified over several loan types, 80 widespread
commercial loan securitization currently is not feasible for all
banks. CRA vouchers, on the other hand, could be traded for any
type of loan that receives CRA credit.
A key advantage of a CRA voucher system over loan securitiza-
tion is flexibility in risk management. When loans are securitized,
the securitizing agent usually issues bonds or short-term commer-
cial paper backed by the pooled loans. The securities are often
sold as structured debt instruments by dividing them into senior
"A-piece" and subordinate "B-piece" tranches. The A piece is
often attractive to institutional investors, while the more risky B
76. See Luxman Nathan, The Growing Securitization of Small Business Loans,
FED. RES. BANK B., Summer 1998, at 4 ("Under the revised Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA), a bank or a bank holding company may be entitled to CRA credit
for purchasing securities backed by small business loans.").
77. Id. at 2-8.
78. Id. at 5.
79. Id.
80. Patricia A. McCoy, The Notional Business Judgment Rule in Banking, 44
CATH. U. L. REV. 1031, 1050-51 (1995) (discussing how, today, restrictions on bank
lending "serve as 'exceedingly crude devices' for ensuring diversified loan
portfolios").
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piece, which absorbs most of the credit risk from the loans, is either
retained by the lender or purchased by less risk-averse investors.
So, although banks could allocate CRA lending more efficiently by
increasing the securitization and trading of CRA-qualifying loans,
the potential exists for risk-management problems at securitizing
banks if they are forced to hold large amounts of relatively risky
and less marketable subordinate tranche debt.
The added value of CRA vouchers over securitization lies in the
fact that CRA vouchers transfer regulatory credit for CRA compli-
ance without altering the credit risk of the banks involved in the
voucher transaction. They accomplish this by effectively separating
the regulatory value of CRA loans from their cash flow value, and
creating a market for trading the regulatory value while leaving the
cash flow value intact. CRA vouchers thus represent a niche mar-
ket that can coexist with loan securitizations to give banks in-
creased flexibility in meeting both their CRA compliance and risk-
management objectives.
CONCLUSION
The CRA was designed to achieve the socially beneficial goal of
combating redlining and disinvestment from LMI communities.
The economic opportunities of residents and businesses in LMI ar-
eas are substantially curtailed by informational asymmetries, which
make lending to those areas more risky than lending to more afflu-
ent areas. With "community capital" being so critical in encourag-
ing profitable lending and investment in LMI areas, it is easy for
those areas to fall victim to a downward spiral, as low levels of
lending create low levels of community development, which make
future lending even more risky and improbable. The CRA acts as
a buffer to stem the tide of disinvestment caused to a large extent
by unrestrained market forces.
As a new century dawns with the modernization of banking reg-
ulations, it seems appropriate to include the CRA in that process.
Although evidence has suggested that the CRA has provided com-
munities with tangible benefits,81 it could provide even greater ben-
81. See EVANOFF & SEGAL, supra note 19; see also KATHERINE A. SAMOLYK &
CHRISTOPHER A. RICHARDSON, THE IMPACr OF BANK CONSOLIDATION ON CRA
BUSINESS LENDING 320-39 (Conference Proceedings of Changing Financial Markets
and Community Development, Working Paper, 2001) (providing econometric evi-
dence that the negative effects of bank consolidation on small business lending are
not as severe for LMI areas in a bank's assessment area; this suggests the CRA bene-
fits LMI areas with regard to small business lending to some degree).
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efits, and provide them more efficiently, by allowing banks to use
the price mechanism to re-allocate the production of CRA-qualify-
ing loans to the banks with the greatest amount of community capi-
tal and the lowest CRA origination costs. Implementing such a
system would be a viable way of enhancing the effectiveness of the
CRA in the twenty-first century.
